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A sovereign proof-of-work UTXO chain — Bitcoin's trust model, a light client that lets a phone verify it, and an honest account of where it stops.
Every block carries a real 256-bit target; a block is valid only if doubleSHA256(header) ≤ target. Nodes follow the chain with the most accumulated work (summed 2²⁵⁶ / (target+1)) — never the longest by count, which timestamp games can cheat. Each node re-validates every block from the pinned genesis and trusts no one.
A transaction spends UTXOs; each input carries a witness [pubkey, signature]. Signatures are ECDSA over SHA-256("WAKECHAIN_TX_V1|" + genesis + "|" + tx) — the network domain binds every signature to this chain, so a transaction can't be replayed onto a fork. Addresses are SHA-256(pubkey)[:40]. Keys are generated and signed on the user's device; the node never sees a private key.
Each block commits a single 32-byte root over the whole UTXO set — a sparse-Merkle accumulator — inside its coinbase. A light client holding only PoW-verified headers can then check "does this coin exist?" from the root and an O(log n) proof alone. A lying node cannot forge a proof that reconciles to the committed root, and non-membership is provable too. This is what powers /verify and the wallet's proven balance.
Honest note: the committed root lives in the tip's coinbase and commits the state as of the previous block (H−1). So a just-received coin shows one block later. The wallet labels this plainly ("proven @ block H−1"). A post-state-root commitment is the planned protocol upgrade.
An optional M-of-N recovery + anti-scam layer with post-quantum (hash-based) co-signatures. It is bounded by consensus so it can protect without becoming the third party it set out to remove — it can freeze or recover under rule, never silently seize.
An AuxPoW path lets WakeChain inherit a parent chain's hashpower — solving the cold-start miner problem while staying sovereign proof-of-work. Designed and tested; not yet active against a live parent.
Your chat identity is a secp256k1 key generated on your device — no phone, no email, no name; your address is the public key. Messages are sealed with a Double Ratchet (the Signal construction, rebuilt from scratch here): an ECDH handshake on secp256k1 seeds an HKDF-SHA256 root chain; each message then draws its own key from an HMAC-SHA256 symmetric chain and encrypts with AES-256-GCM, the message header bound in as associated data. A DH ratchet injects fresh entropy every time the direction of the conversation flips, and consumed keys are destroyed.
Transport is an off-chain, store-and-forward relay on the same nodes: it holds ciphertext only (7-day TTL), gossips between nodes, and verifies each sender signature before storing — so a forged or tampered envelope is rejected before it is ever trusted. Keys, history and contacts live encrypted on your device.
Honest note: the ratchet was built, found broken by two independent internal reviews, redesigned, and re-audited — it is self-audited twice, not yet third-party audited, so we do not call it "perfect." Forward secrecy protects what the network holds, not plaintext history saved on a device someone fully controls. The relay still sees metadata — which address talked to which, and when (not what) — and your IP, as with every app; use a VPN or Tor to hide it. A rare simultaneous-first-message race can drop an opening message (resend resolves it). The full story is in the whitepaper §8.
Two nodes and one miner, all founder-operated — so the "two independent nodes agree" check the wallet performs is only as strong as their independence, which today is limited. A single CPU miner means the chain is not yet economically secure against a 51% attack (merged mining is the intended answer). This is a live testnet, hardened and honest, not a mainnet holding value. Every page here says exactly what it proves and where it stops.